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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
THE SCOPE AND REGULATORY LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS UNDER THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
OF 1938
T HERE have been several areas in which disagreement between the
executive and legislative branches of our government has almost pre-
cipitated a complete stoppage in the proper functioning of government in
the area affected. Fortunately such an iffipasse has not been reached in that
international aspect of aviation law which concerns itself with the proper
metes and bounds of executive agreements concluded under the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938. But it is not unthinkable that such an unwanted hap-
pening may occur in the future even though not now foreseeable. And
thus, it seems logical to take another look at the statutes, doctrines, and
precedents that appear controlling in the field. With these as a background,
it may be possible to work toward a determination of the authority of the
executive, and the line of demarcation-however wavering and indistinct
it. may seem at times-between the legislative and executive departments
of our government, when it becomes advisable to conclude agreements under
the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
Section 802, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,1 provides:
"The Secretary of State shall advise the Authority of, and consult with
the Authority concerning, the negotiation of any agreements with foreign
governments for the establishment or development of air navigation, in-
cluding air routes and service."2
Section 1102, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,3 provides in part:
"In exercising and performing its powers and duties under this Act,
the Authority shall do so consistently with any obligation assumed by
the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in
force between the United States and any foreign country or foreign coun-
tries . . 4
Other sections of the Act require a "foreign air carrier" to obtain a
permit from the Board before it may engage in "foreign air transporta-
tion,"5 and makes such permission by the Board subject to the approval of
152 Stat. 1014; 49 U.S.C. 602.
2 Reorganization Plan IV, 54 Stat. 1235, provides that where the word
"Authority" appears in the Civil Aeronautics Act above, it shall be read "Civil
Aeronautics Board."
8 52 Stat. 1026; 49 U.S.C. 672.
4 See Footnote 2 above with respect to the use of "Authority" in this section
of Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
5 CAA, sec. 402; 52 Stat. 991, 49 U.S.C. 482; "Foreign air carrier" is defined
as ".... any person, not a citizen of the United States, who undertakes, whether
directly or indirectly, or by a lease or any other arrangement, to engage in for-
eign air transportation." (CAA 1938 sec. 1 (20), 52 Stat. 977 (20), 49 U.S.C.
401 (20)) ; and "Foreign air transportation'! is defined as ". . . the carriage by
aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire
or the carriage of mail by aircraft, in commerce between, respectively . .. a
place in the United States and any place outside thereof, whether such com-
merce moves wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and partly by other forms
of transportation." (CAA 1938, sec. 1 (21) (c);.52 Stat. 977 (21) (c), 49 U.S.C.
401 (21) (c)).
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the President.8 The Act requires a foreign air carrier to file with the Board
its tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation fur-
nished by it,7 provides for a foreign rate study,8 and for procedures for
continuation and termination of foreign mail contracts.9
In addition to this, the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended, pro-
vides, in sec. 6 (c) thereof:
• "If a foreign nation grants a similar privilege in respect of aircraft
of the United States, and/or airmen serving in connection therewith, the
Civil Aeronautics Authority [Board] may authorize aircraft registered
under the law of the foreign nation and not a part of the armed forces
thereof to be navigated in the United States. No foreign aircraft shall
engage in air commerce otherwise than between any state, territory, or
possession of the United States (including the Philippine Islands) or the
District of Columbia, and a foreign country. 1
0 I
This section of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was considered sufficient
authority to permit negotiations with the British, Canadian, and Irish
authorities that ultimately led to the establishment of transatlantic flight
schedules and the subsequent issuing of permits to Pan-American Airways
and Imperial Airways in 1927. This was accomplished by executive agree-
ments. It is not illogical to believe that the drafters of the 1938 Act were
fully aware of the understandings reached with the British, Canadian, and
Irish authorities for the establishment of those transatlantic services; and
that the drafters of the Act assumed that there might be further executive
agreements dealing with flights in international air transportation."-
Typical Air Transport Agreements
There have been forty-seven air transport agreements entered into by
the United States subsequent to. enactment of the 1938 act.12 Typical of
these are the Bermuda agreement, 18 the Paris agreement,14 and the bilateral
agreement with Canada. 15
6 CAA, 1938, see. 801, 52 Stat. 1014, 49 U.S.C. 601, provides In part: "... or
any permit issuable to any foreign air carrier under section 402, shall be sub-ject to the approval of the President...
7 CAA, 1938, see. 403, 52 Stat. 992, 49 U.S.C. 483.
8 CAA, 1938, sec. 404(c), 52 Stat. 993 (c), 49 U.S.C. 484(c).
9 CAA, 1938, sec. 405(b), 52 Stat. 994(b), 49 U.S.C. 485(b).
1049 U.S.S. 176(c), as amended by sec. 1107(i) (1) and sec. 1107(i) (5) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938. See Note 2, supra for substitution of "Board"
for "Authority."
11 Article by Stephen Latchford, Adviser on Air Law, Aviation Division,
Department of State, titled "Concerning Acceptance of Aviation Agreements as
Executive Agreements," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1945.
12 See compilation of Air Transport Services Agreements dated March 1958
prepared by the Aviation Division, Department of State.
13 Air Services Agreement between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, effective February 11,
1946; TIAS 1507.
14 Air Transport Services Agreement between the United States of America
and France, entered into force March 27, 1946, and Provisional Arrangement
effected by Exchange of Notes signed at Paris December 28 and 29, 1945; TIAS
1679 as amended by TIAS 2106 (entered into force July 11, 1950), TIAS 2257(entered into force March 19, 1951) and TIAS 2258 (entered into force March
19, 1951).
15 Air Transport Services Agreement between the United States of America
and Canada superseding Agreement of February 17, 1945 as amended, entered
into force June 4, 1949; TIAS 1934.
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The Bermuda agreement, in its more important points, grants the use
of certain specified routes and facilities in the country of each contracting
party to the other contracting party,' 6 provides for requirements of opera-
tions according to the laws and regulations of the contracting state,17
provides for charges to be made for the use of airports and other facilities,' 8
and outlines procedures to be followed in the event disputes arise between
the contracting states' 9 or in the event a modification is desired by either
state.2 0 It is significant to note that existing operating rights granted to
either state or a carrier of either state by the other state are not abrogated 2'
and that any future multilateral agreement to which both contracting states
may be parties will serve to modify the bilateral one so that the provisions
of the latter will conform to those of the former.2 2 The freedom to embark
or disembark international traffic destined for or coming from countries
other than the contracting ones is circumscribed by "general principles of
orderly development" 23 and made ". . subject to the general principle that
capacity should be related: (a) to traffic requirements between the country
of origin and the countries of destination; (b) to the requirements of
through airline operation; and (c) to the traffic requirements of the area
through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional
services.124
The provisions of the Paris agreement bear a striking resemblance to
those contained in the Bermuda agreement; and well they might since the
signing of the former followed the signing of the latter by only a little over
a month. It is probable that preliminary drafts of the two agreements
were being prepared at nearly the same time. There is, however, one im-
portant feature appears in the Paris agreement that does not seem to be
among the provisions of the Bermuda agreement. Article VII of the former
grants to all air carriers for international air services of each contracting
party and to all operational flights incidental to such services, "(1) the
right to fly across [the territory of each contracting state] without landing;
(2) the right to land in [the territory of each contracting state] for non-
traffic purposes." 25 There is a significant change wrought by a supplemental
agreement entered into between the United States and France.26 Article X
of the Paris agreement was amended to provide for appointment of three
arbitrators within ninety days of the date of delivery of a diplomatic note
16 Supra, note 13, Art. I and Annex I and III, "1... the use on the said routes
at each of the places specified therein of all the airports . . ., together with
ancillary facilities and rights of transit, of stops for non-traffic purposes and of
commercial entry and departure for international traffic in passengers, cargo
and mail ...
17 Supra, note 13, Arts. 2 and 5.
Is Ibid., Art. 3.
19 Ibid., Art. 9.
20 Ibid., Art. 8.
21 Ibid., Art. 10 which also states, "Except as may be modified by the pres-
ent agreement, the general principles of the air navigation arrangement between
the two Contracting Parties, which was effected by an Exchange of Notes dated
March 28, and April 5, 1935, shall continue in force insofar as they are applica-
ble to scheduled international air services, until otherwise agreed by the Con-
tracting Parties."
22 Ibid., Art. 11.
28 Ibid., p. 19.
24 Ibid., p. 19.
25 Supra, note 14, p. 6.
2 6 Air Transport Services Agreement between the United States of America
and France Amending Article X of Agreement of March 27, 1946, as amended,
entered into force March 19, 1951; TIAS 2257.
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by either contracting state to the other, requesting arbitration of a dispute
between the two. The arbitrators are empowered to render an "advisory
report" and the contracting states agree to "... use their best efforts under
the powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in any
such advisory report. '27 With the further exception of the fact that the
Paris agreement mentions neither the effect of a future multilateral agree-
ment nor the efficacy of preceding agreements between the states the re-
mainder of the agreement contains provisions that, in substance, achieve the
same results as those achieved in the Bermuda agreement. 28
The major provisions of the bilateral agreement with Canada 29 contain
most of the best features of both the Bermuda and Paris agreements. A
new method of definition and succinct clarification of a portion of the pro-
visions of the agreement is used by making reference to definitions contained
in the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago Decem-
ber 7, 1944 to which both contracting states are parties. 30 There are
provisions requiring conformation of the bilateral agreement to any future
multilateral agreement to which both contracting states are parties 1 and
protecting the efficacy of "existing right and privileges relating to air
transport services" granted previously by either contracting state to an air
line of the other.32 Somewhat incongruously, however, the agreement pro-
vides for the superceding of a previous agreement between the two states
"relating to civil air transport effected by an Exchange of Notes of Febru-
ary 17, 1945" 33 as amended by "an Exchange of Notes of April 10 and 12,
1947." 34 This is contained in Article 14 of the agreement. Not so strangely
perhaps, the provision relating to arbitration of disputes, while similar to
that contained in the amendment to the Paris agreement,8 5 is not as com-
plete.36
Some Congressmen Evidence Opposition
Possibly as a result of the fact that some of the negotiations for these
agreements or others similar to them3 7 were conducted in secrecy, some
27 Ibid., p. 4.
28 Ante, p. 3.
29 Supra, note 15.
SO E.g., Arts. 1 and 8 (in the latter of which it is provided only, however,
that the agreement shall be registered with ICAO) and Art. 10 which utilizes
ICAO as the agency through which notification be made of termination of the
agreement by either contracting state to the other.
31 Supra, note 15, Art. 12.
32 Ibid., Art. 9.
33 U.S. Exec. Agreement Series 457; 59 Stat. 1383.
34 TIAS 1619; 61 Stat. 2869.
35 Supra, note 26.
36 Supra note 15, Art. 13 which provides for the appointment of arbitrators
within ninety days of the date of delivery by either party to the other of a note
requesting arbitration of a dispute. The provision, however, does not contain
any method for the appointment of arbitrators in the event the contracting states
fail or refuse to perform their function in this respect, i.e., each contracting
state to have one arbitrator and the third to be agreed upon by the two originally
named. It provides only for the appointment of the third-in the event of dis-
agreement by the two original arbitrators-by the President of the Council of
ICAO. The contracting states do agree, however, to ". . . use their best efforts
under the powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in
any ... advisory report [reached by the arbitrators]".
87 Supra, note 12.
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members of Congress have evidenced a desire to prohibit further executive
agreements of this type.88
For these reasons, it seems wise to carefully re-examine the scope and
legal limits of executive agreements entered into under the authority of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
First, certain other provisions of that Act should be considered in con-
junction with the negotiation of executive agreements. In the declaration
of policy in section 2 of the 1938 Act, the Board is enjoined to consider,
among other things, (as being in accord with public convenience and neces-
sity and in the public interest) "The encouragement and development of an
air transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs
of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States. . . ." (Italics
supplied.) It would seem paradoxical indeed to attempt to encourage the
development of foreign air commerce without permitting the necessary
authority to be vested in the executive, i.e., the Secretary of State, to allow
it to attempt to negotiate with foreign governments to consummate such
development.
There is still another provision of the 1938 Act which appears to con-
template negotiations between the United States and governments for the
development of international air transportation. It is section 30139 and it
provides:
"The Administrator is empowered and directed to encourage and foster
the development of civil aeronautics and air commerce in the United
States and abroad, and to areas, and other navigation facilities. . ....
(Italics supplied.)
It seems obvious that the drafters of the 1938 Act anticipated that some
action might be necessary to properly develop foreign air commerce. The
language used appears to carry the implication that when negotiations to
further foreign air comerce became wise or necessary they would be under-
taken by the appropriate agency of the executive.
40
Since the term "executive agreement" covers documents of widely vary-
ing character that may not be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent
as to ratification for many different reasons, use of the term is frequently
confusing.
Agreements made by the executive and not submitted to the Senate have
been classified as (1) agreements made pursuant to authority contained in
acts of Congress, and (2) agreements entered into purely as executive acts
88 Resolution from the Committee on Commerce, Appendix A, Senate Report
No. 482, 81st Congress; S. 1814, 79th Congress; S. 11, 80th Congress; S. 12, 81st
Congress. The Senate bills were identical ones to amend the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, as amended, to provide "No agreement with any foreign government
restricting the right of the United States or its nationals to engage in air trans-
port operations, or generally granting to any foreign government or its nationals
or to any airline representing any foreign government any right or rights to
operate in air transportation or air commerce other than as a foreign air carrier
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, or respect-
ing the formation of or the participation of the United States in any international
organization for regulation or control of international aviation or any phases
thereof, shall be made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government of the
United States except by treaty."
39 52 Stat. 985; 49 U.S.C. 451.
40 Article by Stephen Latchford, Adviser on Air Law, Aviation Division,
Department of State, titled "Concerning Acceptance of Aviation Agreements as
Executive Agreements," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1945.
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without legislative authorization. 41 One writer says, "In addition to the
authority of the President under the Constitution to negotiate and sign
treaties with foreign governments and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate to ratify them, the executive is empowered without legislative
sanction to conclude with foreign governments certain classes of agreements
which are not classified as treaties in the sense in which that term is used
in the Constitution. These agreements are concluded by virtue of the
authority inherent in the chief executive under the Constitution and are
confined to subject matter within the purview of his constitutional author-
ity.,' 42
In view of the specific language in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
it is submitted that the executive agreements to. be examined in this paper
fall within the classification of those made pursuant to authority contained
in acts of Congress.
Doctrine of "Inherent Powers"
It is significant, however, to note at this juncture that the executive has,
according to many authorities, the inherent power to enter into executive
agreements completely exclusive of any prior congressional authorization
or subsequent congressional ratification. This significant fact should be
borne in mind throughout any discussion of the scope and legal limits of
executive agreements under the Civil Aeronautics Act.
In the present world atmosphere it would seem gratuitous to repeat that
the United States cannot be left at the untender mercy of an obstructionist
minority that conceives its interests to be antithetical to that of the remain-
der of the nation. The United States must remain unshackeled in order to
shoulder its share of leadership in the world community. Concomitantly,
its executive officers-charged with the task of negotiating with foreign
governments-must be permitted a reasonable amount of freedom and flexi-
bility responsive, of course, to the will of the majority in executing, modify-
ing and abrogating international agreements. 43 "The practices of successive
administrations, supported by the Congress and by numerous court decisions,
have for all-practical purposes made the Congressional-Executive agreement
authorized or sanctioned by both houses of Congress interchangeable with
the agreements ratified under the treaty clause by two-thirds of the Senate.44
Presumably also the scope of these agreements is similar to that of treaties
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.
Actually tnere is little difference between an executive agreement and
41V. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 390 (1940-44).
42Ibid, page 402, quoting Under Secretary of State, Joseph Grew. This
authority, it is submitted, stems from the fact that the chief executive is the
... sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations. . . ." (See statement of John Marshall while a member
of the House of Representatives, 10 Annals of Congress 613 (1800)) ; from Art.
2, sec. 1 of the Constitution which says "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America"; from Art. 2, sec. 2, which says
"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, . . ."; and from Art 2, sec. 3, which says ". . . he shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, . ." and " . . he shall receive Ambassadors and
other public ministers . . ..
48 On this subject see generally Dunn, Peaceful Change (1937); Brierly, The
Law of Nations, 72-77 (4th ed. 1949); and New Fabian Research Bureau, Re-
vision of Treaties (1932).
44 Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements; Inter-
changeable Instruments of National Policy; I, 54 Yale Law Journal 181, 187.
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a treaty. The Harvard Research in International Law45 succintiy states,
"The distinction between so-called 'executive agreements' and 'treaties' is
purely a constitutional one and has no international significance46 and that
".... there is no rule of international law and no definite usage which deter-
mines what shall be the essential constituent elements of a 'treaty' or which
lays down any tests or criteria by which a treaty may be distinguished
from other international instruments such as conventions, protocols, ar-
rangements, declarations, etc."47
In fact, an executive agreement has been defined as an agreement which
is made by the President on his own authority and which can be carried out
by this country without action on the part of the legislative branch of the
Government. 48 The effectiveness of executive agreements concluded under
the chief executive's diplomatic and war powers has been acknowledged by
the Supreme Court in the Pink and Belmont cases.
49
Examples of Congressional-Executive type agreements may be found
in the agreements entered into under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934
and Postal Treaties under the authority of the provisions of postal laws.
The latter authorized the President to conclude such treaties with foreign
governments.
Reliance on Constitutional Provision
Development of the first Congressional-Executive agreements occurred
under a Constitutional provision that, at first blush, appears to be applicable
solely to domestic problems. Article 1, Section 8 authorizes Congress "...
(7) to establish post offices and post roads ...." In 1792, Congress, under
the authority of this Constitutional provision, enacted legislation empower-
ing the Postmaster General to enter into agreements with foreign powers
for reciprocal mail delivery. 50 Numerous similar statutes have been enacted
in subsequent years and more than 300 postal conventions have been con-
cluded under their authority. 51 Judicial tribunals have held these conven-
tions to be "part of the law of the land"52 ; similarly, treaties are specifically
stated to be such by Article VI of the Constitution.
In the Curtiss-Wright case, 53 Congress enacted a joint resolution54 pro-
viding, in substance, that if the President found that the prohibition of the
sale of arms and munitions to countries then engaged in armed conflict in
the Chaco might contribute to the reestablishment of peace in these coun-
tries he could make a proclamation to the effect that it would be unlawful
45 Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Law of Treat-
ies: Draft Convention, with comment (1935) (published as 29 Am. J. Int. L.
Supp., No. 4).
46 Ibid., at 697.
47 Ibid., at 687.
48 Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 79th
Congress, on S. 1814, p. 139.49 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
801 U.S. 324, (1937).
50 1 Stat. 236 (1792).
51 McClure, International Executive Agreements, Columbia University Press,
p. 6. Apparently only three of these postal conventions have been submitted to
the Senate.
52 See Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 217 (1882); U.S. v. Eighteen
Packages of Dental Instruments, 222 Fed. 121, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
58 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). For a more
recent case echoing this doctrine, see United States v. Boreno, 50 F. Supp. 520
(D. Md. 1943).
4 48 Stat. 811, c. 365.
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to sell arms and munitions to those countries. Section 2 of the j6int resolu-
tion provided a penal sanction for the violation of the provisions of the
resolution. Pursuant to the resolution, the President on May 28, 1934,
issued a proclamation 55 finding that the prohibition of sale of the mentioned
articles to the Chacoan countries would contribute to peace among them,
admonishing all to abstain from violating the provisions of the joint reso-
lution, and warning that violation would be rigorously prosecuted. Curtiss-
Wright Corporation was indicted for conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns
to one of the Chacoan countries in violation of the joint resolution and the
proclamation. Curtiss-Wright contended, among other things, that the joint
resolution effected an invalid delegation of legislative power to the execu-
tive. The Supreme Court rejected this view 6 and significantly held that
the scope of the delegable Congressional powers in the foreign relations
field exceeds that in the domestic one.57
A careful consideration of the extent to which Congressional-Executive
agreements have become interchangeable with treaties completely refutes
any suggestion that the executive agreement is confined to matters that are
minor or unimportant in character.5 8 In fact, since the early part of the
nineteenth century executive agreements have been used more and more.
The trend has been to use them in the place of treaties wherever possible. 59
And, most significantly, executive agreements have been used interchange-
ably with treaties as a means of concluding negotiations with foreign
nations for the settlement of commercial and industrial problems from the
very beginning of the Republic.60 Excepting only the Pan-American Con-
vention of 192861 international air transportation matters have been con-
65 48 Stat. 1744.
56 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-29 (1936).
57 "The two classes of powers [those in respect of foreign or external affairs
and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs] are different both in respect
of their origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal govern-
ment can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect
the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal
affairs . . .", Ibid. at 315-6. ". . . [legislative] participation in the exercise of the
power [over external affairs] is significantly limited. In this vast external realm,
with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. ... ",
Ibid. at 319. "It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations-.. .", Ibid. at 319-20.
58 For an elaboration of contra doctrines see Borchard, Against the Proposed
Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties (1944) 30 A.B.A.J. 608, 609, n. 12;
Borebard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty? (1944), 53 Yale
Law Journal 664; and Borchard, The Two-thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change
Opposed (1945) 3 Econ. Council Papers No. 8, p. 7.
59 McClure, International Executive Agreements, Columbia University Press,
p. 4 "During the first fifty years of government under the Constitution the Presi-
dent is known to have entered into some 27 international acts without invoking
the consent of the Senate, while 60 became law as treaties; for the second half
century the figures appear to be 238 executive agreements and 215 treaties; and
for the third similar period, 917 executive agreements and 524 treaties."
60 In 1939 Asst. Secretary of State Sayre compiled a list of 81 executive
agreements dealing with commercial matters. All but 15 had been negotiated
before 1933. The list did not include agreements negotiated under the 1934
Trade Agreements Act. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements
Act, 39 Col. L. Rev. 751, 770-5 (1939).
61 U.S. Treaty Ser., No. 840 (1928). This convention had the advice and
consent of the Senate prior to ratification.
JUDICIAL
sistently negotiated by the United States solely by means of bilateral agree-
ments with individual foreign nations. In various instances these agree-
ments have provided for issuance of airmen and air worthiness certificates,
division of routes, mutual landing privileges, and right of passage in com-
mercial flights. 62
The United States has adhered to two international tele-communication
conventions.6 3 But it has entered into a large number of similar arrange-
ments by means of bilateral executive agreements concluded with individual
foreign nations; these were concluded without the authority of any specific
legislation. 64 Other matters which have been concluded by executive agree-
ments are those relating to international financial and war debt agree-
ments.6 5 The wide range is obvious; indeed, it is so great that "... it seems
reasonable to conclude that there is no apparent reason why the use of such
agreements should not be extended to any other matter not yet encompassed
that may approximately be the subject of inter-governmental arrange-
ments. ' 66 In fact, there is some judicial authority for the position that
Congress cannot now restrict the power of the executive to enter into execu-
tive agreements either under congressional authorization or by virtue of
his constitutional prerogatives. In Myers v. U.S. 7 the Supreme Court sus-
tained the proposition that when "long practice" has confirmed the propriety
of the executive, alone, exercising control in a given situation, although
Constitutional language could be interpreted to give Congress an equal
voice, the latter would not be permitted to restrict the executive's action by
legislation.
Effect and Duration
There has been a proliferation of remarks by scholars and statesmen
concerning the limited effect and uncertain duration of executive agree-
ments. Though these remarks are abstract and more often than not un-
substantiated, they have cast doubt upon the efficacy of executive agreements.
Even prior to the Curtiss-Wright, Belmont and Pink cases68 there were
numerous decisions which upheld the validity and force of executive agree-
62 See e.g., U.S. Exec. Agreem't Ser. Nos. 24 (1931), 38 (1932), 47 (1933),
50 (1933), 54 (1933), 58 (1934), 76 (1935), 110 (1937), 129 (1938), 143 (1939),
152 (1939), 153 (1939), 159 (1939), 166 (1939), 186 (1940).
63 The Washington Convention of 1927, 4 Malloy Treaties at 5031 and the
Madrid Convention of 1932, 4 ibid at 5379. These conventions received Senate
approval.
64 See e.g., U.S. Exec. Agreem't Ser. Nos. 34 (1932), 62 (1934), 66 (1934),
72 (1934), 109 (1937), 136 (1938). For earlier examples, see 3 Malloy Treaties
at 2707, 2768.
65 See Schuman, Int'l. Politics, 1941 Ed. (452-6) ; 3 Malloy Treaties at 2601;
4 ibid. at 4213; 47 Stat. 3 (1931); Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administra-
tion (1936) c. 6; and other citations set out in 54 Yale L.J. 279, Footnotes 138-
166.
66 54 Yale L.J. 282, supra, note 19.
67 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The nub of the case is well stated in 54 Yale L.J.
295, footnote 18. "The question involved was whether the President had the
exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States. Since Art.
II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution empowered the President to appoint officials only
'by and with the advice and consent of the Senate' or, in the case of minor offi-
cials, pursuant to statute, it would seem logical to assume that Congress could
impose conditions on the exercise of the removal power. However, usage and
the importance of preserving the President's control of the executive depart-
ments were held to preclude congressional control of removals. The doctrine of
the Myers case was not overruled in Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602
(1935) which merely held the President's removal power was limited in the case
of members of independent regulatory commissions with quasi-judicial functions."
I 68 Supra, notes 28 and 31.
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ments under domestic law.69 In fact it has been said there is "no instance
known where executive agreement had been judicially declared to be invalid
or go beyond the constitutional authority of the executive." 70 In both the
Belmont and Pink cases, the Supreme Court took the position that interna-
tional agreements concluded by the executive by virtue of the constitutional
power were predominant over state laws and judicial decisions and bound
all courts under the supremacy clause, in the same way as treaties. Missouri
v. Holland7' is generally conceded to be the leading authority for the propo-
sition that a treaty is superior to the state law. The Belmont and Pink
doctrine is an extension of that contained in Missouri v. Holland so that
presidential agreements are covered. It is submitted that the language is
sufficiently broad to include Congressional-Executive agreements. 72
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has held that where there is a
conflict between provisions of a treaty and those of a statute, the document
that has most recently come into force will govern. 73 As has been pointed
out previously, Congressional-Executive agreements are part of the "law
of the land."' 74 Hence, such an agreement would supercede an earlier treaty
if provisions of the two were in conflict.
The Harvard Research Draft of the Law of Treaties states that "for
purposes of international law [executive agreements] are not to be dis-
tinguished from treaties."75 It is the opinion of many publicists that even
unwritten agreements are enforceable if the agents who entered into the
obligations were authorized to do so by their respective nations and if the
requisite intent to make the agreements binding, was present.76
Great difficulty has often been encountered in determining the duration
69 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U.S. 1866) ; Texas v. White, 7 Wall.
700 (U.S. 1868); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649 (1892); B. Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912); Cotzhausen
v. Nazro and U.S. v. Eighteen Packages of Dental Instruments, supra, Note 30.
70 Catudal Executive Agreements: A Supplement to the Treaty-Making
Procedure 10 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1942).
71 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The United States entered into a treaty with Great
Britain providing for the protection of migratory birds. Opponents of the treaty
vigorously contended that the provisions of the X Amendment taken in conjunc-
tion with the current interpretation of the commerce clause, reserved regulation
of the subject matter exclusively to the States. The Supreme Court sustained
the validity of the treaty.
72 In U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-2 (1937) the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Sutherland speaking, says "In respect of all international negotiations
and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines dis-
appear .... Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully
undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when Judicial au-
thority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions, state laws,
and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision . . .". Cf. the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Pink Case, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942): "All
constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial depart-
ment, have as much legal validity and obligation, as if they proceed from the
legislature, . ..".
73 Alvarez y Sanchez v. U.S., 216 U.S. 167 (1910); The Chinese Exclusion
case, Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. 130 U.S. 581 (1889); The Head Money cases, Edye
v. Robertson 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
74 Supra, p. 13 and note 52.
75 29 Am. J. Int. L. Supp., No. 4 pps. 667 and 686. See note 20, supra. To
the same effect, Briggs, The Law of Nations 839 (2d Ed. 1952) ; Hyde Constitu-
tional Procedures for International Agreements by the United States 31 Proc.
Am. Soc. Int. L. 45 (1937); 1 Oppenheim, International Law 707-8 (5th Ed.
Lauterpacht 1937).
76 Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, etc., 29 Am.
J. Int. L. Supp. No. 4, 728-32. Difficulty of proof of provisions should cause a
nation to rigidly proscribe the use of unwritten agreements.
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of an executive agreement. In considering this factor one should remember
that treaties and executive agreements possess a dual status. They are
(1) part of the law of the United States and (2) intergovernmental con-
tracts. 77 Additionally, it is erroneous to believe that treaties and executive
agreements have any particular claim to a special kind of permancy. They
always have echoed-and presumably will continue to echo-the ebb and
flow of international power relations.
There are six ways in which the domestic impact of treaties as the "law
of the land".may be rendered of no effect. First, and perhaps most obvious,
conflicting terms or an express provision for repeal in a later treaty renders
a prior one negatory 78 Second, a later executive agreement will supercede
an earlier treaty.79 Third, a joint resolution or similar congressional en-
actment may conclude a treaty if the latter is clearly denounced.8s Fourth,
as a corollary to the first method, a treaty may be terminated obliquely by
the passage of inconsistent or conflicting legislation.8' Fifth, if Congress
fails to pass legislation necessary to implement the treaty or refuses to
appropriate funds needed to assure its efficacy the treaty is of no practical
effect.82 Sixth, a treaty may be terminated by the executive denouncing it,
either after Congress has authorized such a step or even in the absence of
congressional authorization. s3 An executive agreement entered into under
authorization of legislation may be terminated by any of these methods and,
according to respectable authority, by the repeal of the legislation as well.
84
In the absence of some specific provision in the executive agreement
providing for termination of it, its termination, Insofar as its international
effects are concerned, could be lawfully accomplished only by agreement.
Any other method, it is submitted, would be a breach of the law of nations.
Abiding By Agreements
The chief factor persuading a nation to live up to one of its agreements
is the very realistic and practical one implicit in the belief that if it does
7 54 Yale L.J. 332, supra, note 19, citing Bottiller v. Domineuez, 130 U.S.
238, 247 (1889); Matthews American Foreign Relations c. 27 (1928).
78 1 Malloy Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agree-
ments between the United States of America and other Powers, 782; 2 ibid. 1710;
5 Moore, A Digest of International Law 363-4.
79 1 Malloy Treaties, etc., 854; Wilson, Handbook of International Law 226,
n. 55 (1939 Ed.).
80 See 5 Moore, International Arbitrations 4429-32 (1898).
81 See e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall., 616, 621 (U.S. 1870); U.S. v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623 (1881); Pigeon River Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138
(1933).
82 See Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (2d rev. ed. 1941).
s8 This was done during the administrations of Presidents Madison (2 U.S.
Dept. of State. Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
722 (1873)), Grant (7 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 371-3,
414-6 (1789-1897)), McKinley (U.S. Dept. of State. Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States 754-7 (1899), and Taft (Ibid., 695-9
(1911), and Taft Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 116-7 (1925)).
84 V. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 429-30; see also U.S. Dept.
of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 77-81
(1894). But for a contrary viewpoint held now by the Department of State, see
Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 79th Congress, on
S, 1814, pp. 133 and 153. The Department of State now takes the position that
executive agreements entered into under authority of congressional enactment
would not fall merely because that congressional enactment was repealed. By
implication, if not by direct statement, the Department's position now is that it
would take special legislation specifically repealing the executive agreement in
addition to the legislation repealing the congressional enactment under which
the executive agreement was executed.
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not do so, other nations will feel free to ignore obligations under interna-
tional agreements to the possible detriment of all. What the late Justice
Cardozo often described as the "tyranny of labels" should not be the de-
cisive force that impels adherence to agreements; nations should just as
readily live up to an agreement if it is labeled "executive agreement" as
if it is more formally called "treaty." Diplomatic history gives credence
to the belief that many executive agreements entered into by the United
States have been adhered to for substantial periods of time. That standard
of fair dealing that should prevail among enlightened nations in a close-
knit world suggests that when it is necessary for a nation to end an execu-
tive agreement prior to its agreed upon termination date, the contracting
nations should utilize a negotiation procedure.
It should be borne in mind that the passage of conflicting legislation by
a nation does not conclude the international obligations imposed by an
executive agreement or treaty even though the instrument is thereby sup-
planted municipally. A contrary viewpoint can only be said to ignore a
breach of international law.
It is submitted that, in the absence of a specific provision in the inter-
national compact, there is no difference in duration between a treaty and an
executive agreement.
In sumary, it is the position of this inquiry-not a novel one, it is sub-
mitted-that there is no important difference, under the Constitution of the
United States or in the diplomatic procedures of our government, between
a treaty and an executive agreement other than the process and authority
by which the consent of the United States to ratification is obtained. To
put it another way, those agreements between the United States and other
governments that are brought into force in accordance with a congressional
authorization or which are subsequently sanctioned by Congress, have the
same legal and practical consequences, not only under the domestic law of
the United States but under international law as well, as treaties consented
to by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.
EARL SNYDER*
INTEGRATION OF SENORITY SYSTEMS AS A
CONDITION FOR AIRLINE MERGERS
N July, 1950, with the approval of the President of the United States,1
the Civil Aeronautics Board in the North Atlantic Route Transfer Case
approved the merger of the Pan American World Airways, Inc. (PAA) and
the American Overseas Airlines (AOA).2 The order included a temporary
provision that no employee of PAA or AOA be discharged without cause.8
On September 22, 1950, this provision was amended to read that for two
years PAA was to reimburse all employees who lost their jobs, had their
*Major, USAF; Office of the Judge Advocate General, USAF, 1951-1953.
A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1947, Indiana University; LL.M. 1953, Catholic University of
America; additional graduate study at George Washington University and Catho-
lic University of America Schools of Law. Attorney, Crawfordsville, Indiana,
1947-1951; Attorney, Corporation Division, Office of Secretary of State of Indiana,
1948; Prosecuting Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit, Indiana, 1949-50; Member
Indiana State and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1 52 STAT. 1014 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §601 (1946).
2 11 C.A.B. 676 (1950).
8 Id at 680.
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salaries reduced, or suffered other monetary loss because of the merger.4
However, the question of the seniority rights of the employees of AOA who
were taken over by PAA was left to negotiation or arbitration between the
various employee groups and PAA. Some classes of employees settled their
differences by negotiation, while others did so by arbitration.5 But the
flight engineers were unable to reach an agreement. The engineers of PAA
insisted that the former AOA employees be placed at the bottom of the
seniority list, while the AOA engineers demanded full credit for the time
spent with AOA. When the flight engineers would not agree to arbitration,
the Civil Aeronautics Board reopened the case and ordered that length of
service with AOA be accorded full recognition in the seniority system of
PAA.6 The PAA flight engineers appealed the order, but it was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Kent v. Civil Aeronautics Board.
7
The authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to impose employment con-
ditions on a merger, consolidation, or acquisition is not expressly provided
for in the Civil Aeronautics Act. However, section 401 (i) of the Act em-
powers the Board to transfer a certificate from one carrier to another if such
transfer isconsistent with the public interest.8 Section 408 (b) of the Act
gives the Board the authority to approve a merger, consolidation, or acquisi-
tion "upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reason-
able and with such modifications as it may prescribe." 9 The Board's authority
to impose conditions is also indicated in section 205 (a), which empowers
the Board to perform such acts, and to issue and amend such orders, as it
deems necessary to carry out the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act
and to exercise its powers and duties thereunder. 10 In section 2 of the Act
the Congressional declaration of policy appears which should also be con-
sidered in determining the extent of the authority of the Board to impose
conditions. That section provides that the Civil Aeronautics Board shall
exercise its powers and duties towards the "encouragement and development
of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;" towards fostering sound
economic conditions in the transport industry, and towards promoting
adequate, economical, and efficient service." It appears that the public in-
terest in this industry will be well served so long as the conditions imposed
tend to promote a faster, safer, and more economical air transport service,
by minimizing labor disputes growing out of mergers and by a just and
reasonable treatment of the employees.
A further indication of the power of the CAB to impose conditions on a
merger is the use made of section 5 (4) (b) of the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1933.12 That section authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission
4 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950), as modified by
12 C.A.B. 140 (1950); See note 64 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1951).
5 O'Donnell v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 200 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir.
1953) ; See note 65 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1952).
6 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 21,432
(1951).
7 204 F. 2d 263 (2d Cir. 1953). The court held that the CAB has statutory
authority to impose such terms and conditions upon a merger as it finds necessary
in the public interest and that an order dealing with seniority was such an in-
terest.
8 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481 (1946).
952 STAT. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §488 (b) (1946).
10 52 STAT. 984 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §423 (1946).
11 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §402 (1946).
12 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U.S.C. §5 (4) (b) (1940).
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to approve railroad consolidation "upon terms and conditions . . . found to
be just and reasonable. 13 The ICC has repeatedly used this authority to ap-
prove the merger of railways on condition that adversely affected employees
would be compensated, and the imposition of these conditions have been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 14 In 1940, Congress amended
section 5 (4) (b) by requiring the ICC to include in its orders of approval
of mergers provisions safeguarding the rights of employees so that they
would not be in a "worse" condition after the consolidation. 15 In 1943 Con-
gress imposed a similar mandatory provision in the telegraph industry
mergers.10 Since 408 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act is worded substan-
tially the same as was section 5 (4) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
and has been interpreted as the CAB interprets the Civil Aeronautics Act,
it would appear that the CAB has the authority to impose employment con-
ditions on its approval of mergers. Furthermore, Congress has recognized
the similarity of the labor problems in these two forms of transportation by
specifically making the Railway Labor Act applicable to air carriers.
17
Finally, as stated in United Western, Acquisition Air Carrier Property :18
"The short answer to any challenge to the Board's power to impose
conditions in a certificate transfer case is that by imposing conditions,
the Board finds that without the conditions the transfer is not consistent
with the public interest and should be disapproved. Hence, any imposition
of conditions does no more than give the parties to a certificate transfer
an opportunity to modify the basis of their transaction and thereby
avoid the order of disapproval which the Board would otherwise be com-
pelled to issue."1 9
The conditions imposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board included com-
pensation for (a) loss of salary attributable to furlough, termination of
employment, or reduction to a lower paying position resulting from the
merger; (b) moving expenses incurred as a result of being forced to accept
a position in a different locality; and (c) an amount equal to the difference
between the fair value of property and the price received for the property
in a forced sale made necessary by a transfer.2 0 These protective provisions
were designed to promote labor peace in air transportation in accordance
with the objectives of section 2 of the Act,21 just as the conditions imposed
by the ICC were designed to promote labor peace in rail transportation.
The PAA flight engineers, however, contended that the integration of the
AOA seniority list with that of PAA is not the type of protective condition
which the Board is empowered to make. Certainly it is not the same as re-
quiring compensation for salary losses and other expenses caused by the
merger. But if. the PAA and AOA flight engineers cannot agree success-
fully, and refuse to arbitrate, then labor peace is broken and air passenger
Is Ibid.
14 United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939); Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 315 U.S. 373 (1942); Railway
Labor Executives Association v. United States, 339 U.S. 1942 (1950).
15 54 STAT. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §5 (2) (f) (1946).
1657 STAT. 8 (1943), 47 U.S.C. §222 (f) (1946).
17 49 STAT. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C.A. § (1943). For the View that the two
methods of transportation are not really comparable, see note 64 HARv. L. REv.
664 (1951).
18 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
19 Id. at 707.
20 United-Western, Acquisition Air Carrier Property, supra note 18; Braniff-
Mid Continent Merger Case, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 21,490 (1952); Delta-
Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 21,557 (1952);
West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 121,508 (1952).
21 See note 11 supra.
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and freight service may be impaired. Such impairment is certainly not in
the public interest, and therefore cannot be tolerated by the Board.
It has been suggested that the CAB could have required that PAA com-
pensate the AOA flight engineers for any loss resulting from reduction or
loss of their seniority rights rather than requiring an integration of sen-
iority systems. 22 Before that could be done however, some very difficult
questions would have to be answered. For example: (a) Will a loss occur,
and if so, what will be the nature and extent of the loss? (b) To what extent,
if any, will merger hinder or aid promotion and pay increases? (c) Will
greater or less job security result from the merger? (d) If no loss can be
shown at the time of the merger, is it possible that there will be a future
loss? (e) Can these and other losses and gains be translated into dollar and
cent values? It thus would appear that the amount that PAA would be
obligated to pay would be next to impossible to compute. Furthermore, since
the situation can be resolved by the integration of the two seniority lists,
such compensation payments would seem to be an unnecessary burden on the
airlines, especially since section 2 of the Act provides for the fostering of a
sound economic condition in the transport industry.
It has also been suggested that the imposing of a permanent seniority
list would be inconsistent with the theory of voluntary settlement of dis-
putes embodied in the Railway Labor Act.23 This theory however, would
logically imply that the Board should impose no conditions whatsoever on
behalf of the employees in companies being merged. If the Board adopted
this position, it would not fulfill its duties as outlined in sections 2, 401 (i),
and 408 (b) of the Act.24
Furthermore, while it is apparently true that the ICC has never imposed
any seniority integration system on a merger or consolidation, it does not
follow that the CAB should refuse to do so. The positions of the unions in
the respective transportation systems are quite different. When the railroad
consolidations and mergers began in the 1930's, the railway unions were
powerful and centralized organizations which represented the same trade or
craft throughout the industry.25 , This meant that the seniority problems
could be and were settled by the Railway Brotherhoods themselves, and the
services of the Commission were not required.26 In air transportation, on
the other hand, the same trade or craft may be represented by a number of
different unions, each competing with the other for members. These rival
unions find it difficult to settle their differences. Furthermore, if a trade is
represented entirely by one union, that organization is unwilling to impose
a settlement which will ant gonize a single group of employees within the
trade to the point where they may decide to join a rival union.27 Thus, as
in the instant case, the settlement of seniority problems in the air trans-
portation industry is an extremely difficult one requiring, in most cases,
some sort of Board action.
Finally, it is not altogether clear that the Board's action was incon-
sistent with the theory of the Railway Labor Act.28 It is true that the serv-
22 65 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1952). This solution would be even less satisfac-
tory in the railroad industry where, unlike the air carriers, their main considera-
tion for merging is for economic reasons.
23 Ibid.; 49 STAT. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C.A. 181 (1943).
24 These duties are outlined in text, supra.
25 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950).
26 But see Commercial Telegrapher's Union v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 F.
Supp. 90 (D, D.C. 1943).
27 See note 22 supra.
28 See note 23 supra.
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ices of the various mediation boards set up to handle disputes were not
utilized, but the Railway Labor Act provides for the use of these Boards in
a dispute arising between employees and the carriers. The act makes no men-
tion of a dispute between two groups of employees. Furthermore, the "spirit"
of the Railway Labor Act, that is, voluntary settlement of disputes, was
carried out. The Civil Aeronautics Board used its power to condition mergers
only when negotiation and arbitration failed to effect a settlement.
29 In
September, 1950, when the merger was first approved,30 the Board in dis-
cussing the seniority question stated:
"It is clear to us that we should not undertake to determine the precise
manner in which the individual seniority lists for various categories
of employees should be merged, or other provisions made for the deter-
mination of seniority. Such a determination is dependent upon so many
factors, and is of such a detailed nature that it would not be practical
for an administrative agency such as the Board to undertake the task.
It would therefore be more desirable that the task be accomplished by
those most directly concerned, the company and the employee groups.
It is a matter which lends itself directly to voluntary agreement by
negotiation and, failing that, to arbitration. We are therefore providing
for such a method of determination here." 31
When a voluntary system was not concluded, a temporary system was
imposed in the hope that the problem would be settled without the Board's
determination.3 2 The Board stated:
"We propose therefore, to give the employee groups concerned and
Pan American one last opportunity to arrive at a resolution of the sen-
iority issue by agreement or by arbitration. If within 30 days, the parties
have not arrived either at an agreement or at an agreement to arbitrate,
we will assign this case for further hearing, and settle the issue ... as
we find to be just and reasonable and in the public interest."8 3
The Civil Aeronautics Board has carried out this policy in the other merger
cases it handled.3 4
A further argument against the imposition of a seniority system by the
CAB is that such a condition may force the airlines to adopt a system in-
consistent with the one which they contracted for with their employees.
This was the situation in the instant case, and the flight engineers of PAA
claimed that CAB could not compel PAA to breach its contract with them.
29 See note 6 supra.
80 See note 25 supra.
s1 Note 25 supra at 130.
82 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 422 (1951).
88 Id. at 423.
34 In some cases the Board has refused to impose conditions of any sort on
the ground that they were not shown to be necessary: Capital Airlines, Inc.-
National Airlines. Inc., 1A CCH AVIATInN LAW REP. 21,162 (1949); Southwest
Renewal-United Suspension Case, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 21,450 (1952).
In other cases broad conditions were imposed and the details left to be worked
out by arbitration: United-Western Acquisition Air Carrier Property, supra
note 18. In still other cases detailed conditions were imposed with the under-
standing that they were subject to revision if the parties reached an understand-
ing or agreement by negotiation or arbitration: West Coast-Empire Merger Case,
supra note 20; Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, supra note 20. Finally,
in Braniff/Mid-Continent Merger Case, supra note 20 as affirmed in 1A CCH
AVIATION LAW REP. 21,572 (1953), the Board ordered negotiation, and failing
that, arbitration. In the instant case, arbitration was not insisted because the
breakdown in negotiations led the Board to believe that the public interest de-
manded a seniority integration system which would be fair to all employees and
that labor difficulties in connection with a merger might deter future desirable
mergers.
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Even if such a contractual provision does exist,85 the Civil Aeronautics Board
is authorized by Congress to impose any reasonable and just conditions by
reasons of sections 2, 401 (i), and 408 (b) of the Act, and the Supreme
Court has held that a private contract must yield to the paramount powers
of a governmental agency in order that the latter may perform its duties
under the statute creating it.36
Further, while the Federal Constitution provides that no state shall pass
any law impairing the obligation of contracts,3 7 the Constitution does not
forbid Congress, when acting within the scope of its powers, to enact laws
the effect of which may operate to impair the obligation of contracts.38
Hence, the obligation of private contracts for the payment of money is sub-
ject to the exercise of the power vested in Congress over the monetary sys-
tem.3 9 Congress also has power to invalidate the provisions of a private
contract calling for the payment of gold coin,40 dealing with public lands
and Indian Territories,4 ' and contracts affected by bankruptcy proceedings.
42
Also, the resulting impairment to the obligations of a contract does not
violate the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.43 In the words of
Chief Justice Hughes:
"Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority
of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when
contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of
Congress, they have i congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their
transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making
contracts about them." 44
In addition, it is well established that the power to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign states is complete in itself, and is un-
restricted except by the limitations upon its authority to be found in the
Constitution.45 That Pan American Airlines is engaged in interstate com-
merce is beyond question. And, as was stated by the Supreme Court in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States :46
35 In North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, supra note 25, the Board outlined
its belief that such a provision in the contract did not exist. In Kent v. C.A.B.,
supra note 7, the court bypassed that question, basing its decision on the fact
that even if the provision were in the contract, the result would still have been
the same.
36 National Licorice Co. v. National Lab. Rel. Board, 309 U.S. 350 (1939);
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1945); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942); J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
37 U.S. CONST. ART. 1 §10.
38 New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922); Norman v. Baltimore
& 0. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago
R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1934); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley,
219 U.S. 467 (1910).
39 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1870).
40 Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 38.
41 Egan v. McDonald, 246 U.S. 227 (1918).
42 Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., supra
note 38.
43 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) ; Louisville J. Bank v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
44 Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 38.
45 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. (U.S. 1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419 (U.S. 1827); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. (1911).
46175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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"Anything which obstructs and thus regulates that commerce which
is carried on among the states, whether it is state legislation or private
contracts between individuals or corporations, should be subject to the
power of Congress in the regulation of that commerce. ' '47
Thus the CAB, a creation of Congress, has the authority to impose con-
ditions upon a merger, even if the conditions will force the airlines to
breach its contracts with its employees. 48
In conclusion, it appears that the Civil Aeronautics Board in integrating
the two seniority systems, acted not only within its powers, but also within
the "spirit" of the Act. The Board had the alternative of either refusing to
act on the problem, or of directing Pan American to integrate former AOA
employees in what appears to be a fair and equitable system. If the Board
had adopted the former course, then the possibility of labor peace being
broken and air passenger and freight service being impaired was enhanced.
Furthermore, continued instability resulting from a lack of settlement of
this problem would not only affect PAA, but also discourage other potential
mergers within the industry, which mergers might well promote the public
interest in better transportation.
47 Id. at 230.48 It is apparent that the constitutionality of the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the regulations issued thereunder must depend upon the existence of a para..
mount constitutional power residing in Congress. Those powers of Congress are
as follows: (a) The power to provide for the common Defense and general Wel-
fare of the United States, (b) the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, (c) To establish Post Offices and post
roads, and (d) the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. ART. 1. §8.
